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Abstract 
In this paper we analyse how fairness considerations, in particular considerations of just 
income distribution, affect whether or not people find tax evasion justifiable and their 
willingness to evade taxes. Using data from the Norwegian “Hidden Labour Market Survey” 
we show that individuals with low hourly wages and long working hours have a higher 
probability of justifying tax evasion. These are individuals that arguably are treated unfairly in 
a tax system that taxes an individual’s total income without taking into account how many 
hours the individual has worked. The same individuals are also more willing and likely to take 
home income without reporting it to the tax authorities. The results are consistent with a 
model in which individuals make a trade-off between economic gains and fairness 
considerations when they make decisions about tax evasion. Taken together our results 
suggest that considerations of fair income distribution are important for the analysis of tax 
evasion. 
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1. Introduction 
Most people feel the need to be able to justify their actions to themselves and to others. This is 
also the case when they decide whether or not to abide by a particular law. It is easier to 
violate a law that one believes is unfair than a law that one believes is fair. In this paper we 
analyse how fairness considerations affect whether or not people believe tax evasion can be 
justified and their willingness to engage in tax evasion. The idea that tax evasion may be 
affected by what the taxpayers perceive to be unfair taxation is not new. For example, 
Bordignon (1993) presents a theoretical framework where taxpayers are more inclined to 
evade taxes if they have to pay a tax rate that is higher than what they think is a fair price for 
the public goods they receive. Fairness effects in tax evasion are also demonstrated in several 
experimental studies, such as Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval (2004) and Spicer and Becker 
(1980). In the present paper we focus on how considerations of a fair income distribution 
might affect people’s propensity to justify tax evasion and thus how likely they are to evade 
taxes.  
 
It is natural to meet attempts to justify tax evasion by appealing to fairness considerations 
with scepticism and ask whether it is just a way to rationalize behaviour determined by other 
types of considerations, such as the expected net economic gain from tax evasion. One way to 
investigate whether fairness considerations play an independent role in motivating tax evasion 
is to identify a group of individuals that is seems reasonable to view as unfairly treated by the 
tax system and then study whether these individuals are more likely to view tax evasion as 
justifiable and more willing to evade taxes. 
 
The obvious problem with such an approach is the inherent difficulty in identifying a group of 
tax payers that it seems reasonable to view as unfairly treated. However, we shall argue that it 
is possible to identify a particular group of tax payers that most people will agree is treated 
unfairly by a progressive tax system. This is the group of individuals who have low hourly 
wages and work long hours. Evidence from both surveys and from economic experiments 
have documented that most people find inequalities reflecting differences in work effort as 
fair (see for example Cappelen et al 2010, Schokkart and Devooght 2003). A progressive tax 
that is levied on the basis of total income reduces inequalities due to differences in work effort 
and it can therefore be seen as unfairly treating those who work long hours. 
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In the empirical parts of this paper we show that among individuals with identical monthly 
wages, an individual with low wages and long working hours is more likely to justify tax 
evasion than an individual with high wages and shorter working hours. We also show that the 
individual with low wages and long working hours is more willing to take home income 
without reporting it to the tax authorities. These results are consistent with our theoretical 
model. The results also turn out to be robust to the inclusion of measures of human capital, 
measures of marginal tax and to the inclusion of norms related to tax evasion as well as the 
expected probability of being caught.   
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present a model in which 
individuals make a trade-off between economic gains and fairness considerations when they 
make decisions about tax evasion. We furthermore argue that individuals with low hourly 
wages and long working hours are unfairly treated in a tax system that does not take account 
of hours worked when taxes are calculated. In section 3 we use data from the “Hidden Labour 
Market Survey” in Norway to analyse empirically the relationship between fairness 
considerations and working hours. In the final section we conclude. 
 
 
2. Justification and willingness to evade tax 
It is evident from surveys (Gaertner and Schwettmann 2007, Schokkaert and Devooght 2003) 
and economic experiments (Camerer 2003) that people are willing to sacrifice pecuniary gains 
in order to avoid large deviations from what they consider to be fair. Such experiments have 
also shown that people care about whether or not income inequality is a result of factors under 
or outside individual control (Konow 2000, Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen and Tungodden 2007).  
 
When people decide whether or not they shall evade taxes, it is reasonable to assume that both 
economic and fairness considerations play a role. Consequently, a person may not be willing 
to evade taxes even if it would give a net economic gain because he finds it difficult to justify 
such behaviour. Similarly, a person may be willing to evade although he does not find it 
justifiable because the economic gain is high. To study the relationship between the ability to 
justify tax evasion and the willingness to evade taxes, we introduce fairness considerations 
into a model of economically optimal tax evasion of the types used in the seminal papers by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Sandmo (1981).  
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To focus on the problem of designing a fair tax system, we assume that the only purpose of 
the tax system is to redistribute income. There is in other words no public good that needs to 
be financed. We assume that there is a constant tax rate t  and everyone receives a uniform 
transfer   /B tY n= , where Y is the total income in the economy and n is the number of 
individuals in the economy.  
 
An individual decides how many hours l he will work for an hourly wage rate w. His total 
income wl is taxed at a rate t, and he also receives the transfer B. Let u be the income he 
chooses not to report to the tax authorities, i.e. he reports only wl u− . We use the standard 
assumption that the probability of being detected is a decreasing, convex function of the 
reported income, i.e. ( )p p wl u= − , where ' 0p < and '' 0p > 1. An alternative is that the 
probability of detection depends on the evaded amount u only. However, it seems reasonable 
that hiding a certain amount is less suspicious the higher the reported income is. 2 The penalty 
tax τ (u) is an increasing and convex function of the unreported income u, and always 
exceeds the evaded tax.3 The expected penalty is then ( ) ( ) ( , )p wl u u u wlτ ϕ− ≡ . It follows 
from the assumptions about (.)p and τ(.) that 1 0ϕ > , 11 0ϕ > , 2 0ϕ > and 22 0ϕ > . The 
expected net income of an individual with unreported income u is  
 
( , ) (1 ) ( ; )y u wl t wl B tu u wlϕ= − + + −   (1) 
 
We assume that the decision to evade is made regularly, and that the evasion is relatively 
small, such that the potential penalty is small relative to the lifetime income. This allows us to 
analyse the tax evasion decision as if the individual is risk neutral, and therefore only cares 
about the expected net income, not the degree of uncertainty. In this respect we depart from 
the Allingham-Sandmo models.  
 
                                                 
1. We do not analyse the game between evaders and tax authorities, such as Reingaum and Wilde (1985 and 
1986) and Erard and Feinstein (1994), but simply assume that the taxpayers expect the probability of detection to 
be a decreasing function of his reported income.  
2 In the theoretical literature on tax evasion, the assumptions differ about what factors that determines the 
probability of detection. For example, the probability of detection depends on reported income in Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and in Kleven et al (2012), while it depends on evaded income in Yitzhaki (1987). 
3 The distinction between penalizing evaded income and evaded tax does not matter for our problem as long as 
we do not discuss changes in the tax rate. 
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We assume that individuals are motivated by a desire for income and leisure and by a desire 
to act in accordance with what they consider to be fair.  For our purpose, we lose no insight by 
using a utility function that is additively separable in a “selfish” and a “moral” part, instead of 
a more general formulation. In this section, the “selfish” part is simply the expected income 
minus the cost of work effort. An individual chooses l and u so as to maximize the following 
utility function.4 
 
*( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )V u l y u wl zc l f ut eβ= − − −       (2) 
 
The first term is the expected income and is given by equation (1). The second term, ( )zc l , is 
the cost of working l hours. The parameter z is a measure of the relative preferences for 
consumption versus leisure. The term (.)fβ  is what we will call the fairness effect on 
evasion: It captures the individuals’ disutility or moral cost of deviating from what he 
considers to be the justifiable evasion, i.e. the evasion that would give the individual a fair 
income. The term *ut e d− ≡ is the difference between the actual evasion ut  and the 
justifiable evasion e*. The disutility is assumed to be increasing in d if the fraction evaded is 
below the fair fraction, and decreasing in d if the fraction evaded is above the fair fraction. 
Hence, '( ) 0f d ≥ if *ut e≥ and '( ) 0f d < if *ut e< . Moreover, ''( ) 0f d > is assumed. The 
weight a person attaches to fairness considerations relative to his narrow self-interest is given 
by β.  
 
2.1. Fair tax evasion 
 
The crucial question is how the justifiable tax evasion, e*, is determined. We shall argue that 
e* is increasing in l for a given income wl and strictly decreasing in w.  It is evident from the 
political debate, surveys (Gaertner and Schwettmann 2007, Schokkart and Devooght 2003), 
economic experiments (Almås et al 2010, Cappelen et al 2007, Cappelen et al 2010, Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer 2004, and Konow 2000) and contemporary theories of justice (Arneson 
1989, Cohen 1989, Dworkin 1981, Fleurbaey 1995, Roemer 1998 and Cappelen and 
Tungodden 2009) that people view some inequalities as fair and others as unfair. For 
example, a large majority view inequalities arising from differences in the number of hours 
worked as fair, while inequalities arising from gender or race are considered as unfair. One 
                                                 
4 In this section, we can leave out subscript i for individual without causing misunderstanding. 
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view that respects the distinction between fair and unfair inequalities is the view that 
individuals should be rewarded in proportion to their work effort. Assuming that person’s i’s 
work effort is captured by li, his fair income Yi* is then given by 
   
wlY
l
lY i
j
i
i == ∑
*           (3) 
 
where w is the average hourly wage rate. This principle of income distribution is in line with 
the core idea of liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice (Dworkin (1981), Arneson 
(1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1998), Kolm (1996), and Fleurbaey (1995). A common 
feature of these theories is that they draw a distinction between responsibility factors and non-
responsibility factors. Inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors are considered to be 
unjust, while inequalities arising from responsibility factors are seen as just. The principle of 
fair income distribution in equation (3) is also consistent with views expressed by a large 
majority of respondents in the Norwegian ”Hidden Labour Market Survey” from 2003 (Barth 
et al. 2008). The survey was designed by the Frisch centre for economic research, and 
undertaken as a representative postal survey by the Markeds og Mediainstituttet A/S. The 
response rate was 58 percent and 1062 individuals where interviewed. In this survey 87 
percent of the respondents agreed with the statement “Income differences that are a result of 
factors under individual control, such as choice of education, profession or work time, should 
be accepted” and 88 percent of the respondents agreed to the statement “People deserve 
equal income for equal labor effort”.  
 
Based on these results, we make the simplifying assumption that people view inequalities due 
to hours worked as fair, while inequalities due to differences in the wage rate are viewed as 
unfair.5 In a model where the pre-tax income is determined by the wage rate and the hours 
work, this implies that the fair income distribution is to distribute in proportion to hours 
worked.  
 
In order to get his fair income, an individual i should pay net taxes equal to: 
 
                                                 
5 How reasonable this assumption is depends on the extent to which hours worked can be freely chosen and the 
extent to which the wage rate is outside individual control.  
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)(** wwlYYT iiiii −=−= .         (4) 
 
Individual i’s actual net tax payment is: 
 
( )i i i i i iT tw l B t w l wl= − = − .         (5) 
 
The unfair tax payment, defined as the difference between the actual tax payment iT  and the 
fair tax payment *T , is *i iT T− . We assume that what an individual perceives as a fair tax 
evasion is positively related to the unfair tax payment. To simplify, we assume that the fair 
evasion equals the unfair tax payment, i.e. * *e T T= − . Using (4) and (5), the fair evasion can 
then be written as: 
 
* * (1 )i i i ie T T w t w l B = − = − − −          (6) 
It follows from Equation (6) that the fair tax evasion may be positive (when actual tax 
payment is higher than the fair tax payment) or negative (when actual tax payment is lower 
than the fair tax payment) and that it is strictly decreasing in the hourly wage rate w. More 
hours worked increases the justifiable evasion if and only if the fair wage rate w  exceeds the 
net hourly wage (1 )t w− . If the fair wage rate is lower than the net hourly wage, the fair 
evasion is negative and decreasing in the number of work hours. However, the crucial result 
for our purpose is that the fair evasion is strictly increasing in the number of hours worked for 
a given total income wl . Hence, it is useful to write the fair evasion as a function of l and wl, 
i.e. *( , )e l wl where *1( , ) 0e l wl > and 
*
2( , ) 0e l wl < . 
 
The intuition behind this result is important: Any linear tax system that sets the rate between 
zero and unity has two opposing effects on unfairness. First, it reduces the inequalities 
between individuals who work the same number of hours, but have different hourly wages. 
Second, it reduces the inequalities between individuals who have the same hourly wage, but 
work different number of hours. If wage rates are seen as outside individual control, while 
hours worked are seen as inside individual control, it might be argued that the first effect 
contributes to reduced unfairness, whereas the second effect contributes to increased 
unfairness.  
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2.2. Fairness and the willingness to evade taxes 
With the fair tax evasion *e specified by (6), the difference between actual and the fair 
evasion can now be written as *( , ) ( , , )ut e l wl d u l wl− ≡ . Since *1( , ) 0e l wl > and
*
2( , ) 0e l wl < , 
it follows that 1( , , ) 0d u l wl t= > , 2 ( , , ) 0d u l wl < and 3( , , ) 0d u l wl > .  The absolute value of d, 
*( , )ut e l wl− , can be called the deviation from fairness. Hence, for a given total income wl 
and evasion u, the deviation from fairness decreases in the number of work hours if 
*( , )ut e l wl> and increases in the number of work hours if *( , )ut e l wl< . Consequently, the 
cost of deviating from fairness, f(d), increases with the number of work hours if *( , )ut e l wl>
and decreases with the number of work hours if *( , )ut e l wl< . 
 
Maximizing V with respect to l and u yields the two first order conditions 
 
( , ) '( )ut u wl f d tϕ β= +          (7) 
 
[ ]2 3(1 ) '( ) '( ) ( , , ) ( , , )t w zc l f d d u l wl d u l wl wβ− = + −      (8) 
 
Equation (7) says that the marginal gain from one dollar evaded, the saved tax payment t, 
should equal the marginal expected penalty uϕ plus the cost or gain from the change in 
fairness, '( ) ( , , )uf d d u l wlβ . Whether the fairness effect is positive or negative depends on 
whether the actual evasion (ut ) is above or below the fair evasion ( *e ). The left hand side of 
Equation (8) is the net gain from working one more hour. The right hand side is the marginal 
effort cost of one more work hour plus the changed cost of deviating from fairness. As for a 
change in evasion, the sign of the fairness effect depends on whether the actual evasion is 
above or below the fair evasion. If an individual evades less than the justifiable amount *e , 
then 0d < and so '( ) 0f d < . This implies that the fairness effect reduces the marginal cost of 
evasion, since more evasion brings evasion closer to its justifiable amount. The fairness effect 
increases the marginal cost of work effort. The reason is that higher work effort increases the 
justifiable evasion, for a given income wl.   
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How do fairness considerations affect peoples’ willingness to evade taxes? In order to study 
this question we compare individuals who have the same total income wl, but who may differ 
with respect to both their wage rates and their relative preferences for consumption over 
leisure. To simplify, we may think of two groups, A and B, where members of group A work 
fewer hours at a higher wage rate than members of group B, i.e A Bw w> and A Bl l<  such that 
A A B Bw l w l= . The reason why members of group B work more hours at a lower wage is that 
they have a higher relative preference for consumption than members of group A, measured 
by a lower value of z.  
 
When β = 0, i.e. when fairness considerations play no role, equation (7) and (8) become 
 
 ( ; )ut u wlϕ=   (7)' 
 
(1 ) '( )t w zc l− =    (8)΄ 
 
Since total income wl is the same for members of both groups, it follows from (7)΄ that they 
will evade the same amount u. Hence, if we compare individuals who have the same total 
labour income wl, but differ with respect to their wage rates and their relative preferences for 
consumption and leisure, we would expect no differences in their tax evasion if fairness 
considerations play no role.  
 
If fairness considerations play a role, i.e. if 0β > , it follows from (7) and (8) that evasion 
must differ between the two groups: Individuals from the high-wage group A will evade less 
than individuals from the low-wage group B. To see this, let us show that the opposite cannot 
be true, i.e. we cannot have A Bu u≥ . Since 
*
1( , ) 0e l wl < , A A B Bw l w l=  and A Bl l<  , implies that 
the fair tax evasion is lower for A than for B, i.e. * *A Be e< . Since
*( , )d ut e l wl= − , this 
implies that A Bd d>  if A Bu u≥ . If A Bu u≥ and A Bd d≥  the right hand side of equation (7), the 
marginal cost of evasion, would be higher for A than for B. Hence, A Bu u≥  cannot be true 
when the first order condition (7) holds for both groups. Since members of the B-group have 
lower wages and a higher relative preference for consumption than members of the A-group, 
 10 
they are treated more unfairly by the tax system. As a consequence, they are willing to evade 
more taxes, i.e. A Bu u< .  
 
To sum up, if there is a fairness effect ( 0)β > , we would expect people who are unfairly 
treated by the tax system, i.e. those who work long hours for a low wage, to be more willing 
to evade than those who work less for a lower wage. As shown above we expect no such 
difference in the willingness to evade if there is no fairness effect ( 0)β = between people who 
have the same income. Our model predicts that people’s willingness to evade taxes does not 
only depend on their total income, but also on whether this income is earned as a result of 
many work hours or a high wage rate. For the same total income, an individual who has 
earned his income as a result of many work hours at a low wage is willing to evade more than 
an individual who earns the same total income with a higher wage rate and fewer work hours.  
 
Our prediction of how fairness consideration affects the willingness to evade taxes differs 
from that of other models. While many other types of fairness arguments implies that an 
individual’s income affects his moral cost of evasion, our model is the first to suggest that it 
matters whether his income is a result of long work hours or a high wage rate. For example, 
the fairness argument of Bordignon (1993) implies that the income of an individual matters 
for his moral cost of evasion since it determines whether or not he pays too much taxes 
compared to his gain from the public expenses. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) discuss moral 
costs that depend directly on the amount evaded, such as bad conscience or social stigma. 
Also in this case, we would not expect the willingness to evade to be affected by whether the 
income is earned as a result of long hours or high wage rates.   
 
3. Empirical analysis  
According to our theoretical model, the propensity to justify tax evasion is increasing in the 
number of hours worked, conditional on monthly income. Furthermore, as a result of fairness 
considerations, an individual’s optimal level of tax evasion, conditional on monthly pay, is 
also increasing in hours worked. We use Norwegian survey data to investigate if these 
patterns show up in the data as well. It should, however, be stressed that the theoretical 
predictions were based on the assumption that the tax system was purely redistributive, while 
the Norwegian tax system also finances public goods.    
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The data is taken from the Survey on the Hidden Labour Market (SHLM). For our analysis we 
use observations of all 532 individuals in the survey who were of the age 18-64 and wage 
earners, working at least 20 hours in regular employment the week before the survey and had 
valid answers to the questions we use. The first question we ask is: Can tax evasion be 
justified? The alternatives were yes, no and do not know. Of the valid answers to this question 
in the full survey, 162 (16%) answered yes, 720 (69%) answered no, while the remaining 160 
(15%) answered do not know. In our sample of 532 individuals, the answers where distributed 
as follows: 
 
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the justification question. Wage earners.  
Yes   96  (18%) 
No  364 (68%) 
Don’t know  72  (13%) 
N  532 
 
In the questionnaire the individuals were also asked about their willingness to take unreported 
income and if they had actually performed unreported work the previous 12 months. Two 
dummy variables, “Willing” and “Actual”, are given the value 1 if the respondent answered 
yes to the respective questions. As we show table A1 in the appendix, 41 percent reported that 
they were willing to take home unreported income, while 11 percent reported having actually 
done unreported work during the last 12 months.   
 
The survey contains information on the human capital variables gender, age, and educational 
level. Respondents are also asked about their perceived probability of being detected if they 
receive unreported income and to what extent they believe that others accept tax evasion. We 
also have information about their pay in their regular job. Several of the variables are reported 
in brackets (see table A1), for instance hourly pay. These variables are transformed into 
continuous variables using the midpoints of each bracket. Working hours is defined as hours 
in their regular job and reported in categories only. In our sample, the intervals are 20-29, 30-
39, 40-49 and 50 hours and more. A continuous variable is constructed, taking the values 25, 
35, 45 and 55 accordingly. Monthly earnings are constructed as the product of hourly pay and 
reported working hours, both measured in terms of their regular job. Summary statistics of the 
key variables in the sample are given in table A1.   
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3.1. Working hours and tax evasion 
Table 2 reports the key indicators of justification and tax evasion for different intervals of 
working hours. Regular weekly working hours in Norway are 37.5 hours per week. As 
predicted by our model, we find an increasing tendency to justify tax evasion as the number of 
hours worked increases. There is also an increasing tendency to be willing to take home 
income without reporting it to the authorities, as well as an increasing tendency to have 
actually performed unreported work during the last 12 months as the number of working 
hours increase. In particular, there appears to be a jump for all three outcomes among those 
who work more than the regular weekly working hours.   
 
Table 2. Tax evasion and working hours  
 
Working 
hours 
Numbers of 
observations 
Justification 
Can tax 
evasion be 
justified? 
Willing 
If you had the possibility to 
take home income without 
reporting it to the tax 
authorities, would you be 
willing to do so? 
Actual 
Have you performed work 
during the last 12 months 
that were not (is not going 
to be) reported to the tax 
authorities? 
20-29 44 11.4 31.8 6.8 
30-39 364 15.1 38.2 9.9 
40-49 99 31.3 52.5 17.1 
50+ 25 20.0 44.0 12.0 
 
Note: Percentage in each working hours category who report that they believe tax evasion can be justified, that 
they are willing to evade taxes and that they actually have evaded taxes the last 12 months.  
 
Clearly, this pattern may be due to a host of factors other than fairness considerations. To 
control for these factors, we undertake a series of simple (probit) regression analyses.  
 
In table 3 we report the results of five simple probit models. In the first three models, the 
dependent variable is the dummy for agreeing that tax evasion can be justified. The main 
prediction from our theoretical model is that for a given income, an individual who work 
more hours to earn this income should be more likely to justify tax evasion. Accordingly, we 
include as our main explanatory variable the log of weekly hours worked. In model 1 we 
control for individual characteristics: gender, age, and education. It turns out that women are 
less likely than men to justify tax evasion and that the probability of justifying tax evasion is 
declining with age. There is also a positive but not significant relationship between hours 
worked and the probability of justifying tax evasion.  
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In model 2 we include control for monthly earnings and (perceived) marginal tax. Thus we 
may compare individuals who work different hours but make the same amount of money. The 
relationship between working hours and justification is strongly positive and doubled from the 
first specification. This observation is consistent with the first prediction of our theoretical 
model. The coefficient is significant at a 1 percent level, but equally important, the effect is 
also economically very significant: Increasing working hours by 10 percent increases the 
probability of justifying tax evasion by 2.5 percentage points, for instance from the average 
level of 18 percent to 20.5 percent. In line with the predictions from our model, we also find 
that the probability of justifying tax evasion is negatively associated with monthly pay, 
conditional on working hours (i.e. changes in the wage rate).  
 
Table 3. Working hours and tax evasion: Probit equations 
                      Justify 1     Justify 2    Justify 3       Willing        Actual    
                           b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se    
ln(working hours)         .1274         .2489**       .2489**       .2756         .1292    
                        (.0955)       (.1222)       (.1132)       (.1771)       (.0873)    
Woman (d)                -.1215***     -.1294***     -.0703**      -.1089**      -.0698**  
                        (.0334)       (.0340)       (.0333)       (.0509)       (.0273)    
Age                      -.0069***     -.0063***     -.0038**      -.0019        -.0006    
                        (.0016)       (.0017)       (.0016)       (.0025)       (.0013)    
Secondary education (d)      .0215         .0301         .0487        -.0294         .0365    
                        (.0521)       (.0532)       (.0518)       (.0682)       (.0388)    
Tertiary education (d)      .0300         .0607         .0863*       -.0892        -.0095    
                        (.0483)       (.0527)       (.0505)       (.0709)       (.0372)    
ln(monthly pay)                        -.0957*       -.0859        -.0643        -.0579    
                                      (.0582)       (.0544)       (.0813)       (.0443)    
Marginal tax                            .1512         .1231        -.2302        -.1273    
                                      (.1829)       (.1706)       (.2655)       (.1443)    
Generally accepted (d)                                  .1025***      .2858***      .0393    
                                                    (.0313)       (.0433)       (.0259)    
Prob(revealed)                                       -.3757***     -.6225***     -.1867*** 
                                                    (.0779)       (.1121)       (.0626)    
                                                                        
                                                                                           
N                    532 532 532 532 532 
 
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at mean values of the r.h.s. variables. . (d) dummy variable. Marginal effects 
are calculated as the effect of a change from 0 to 1. Levels of significance (*** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10).  
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One potential problem with this result is that there may be a relationship between reported 
earnings to the tax authorities, and the probability of being audited by the same authorities. 
People who intend to evade taxes might therefore work more hours in order to reduce the 
probability of an audit. This relationship may create a spurious correlation between working 
hours in regular employment and the probability of justifying tax evasion. We therefore add 
the individual’s perceived probability of being caught by the tax authorities, as well as the 
individual’s perception of other’s acceptance of tax evasion in model 3. We note that these 
variables have large coefficients and considerable explanatory power on our dependent 
variable, but that the association between working hours and justification is more or less 
unaffected by the inclusion of these variables.  
 
In model 4 we report from a probit analysis of the probability of replying ‘yes’ to the 
“willing” question (see the heading of table 2 for the full wording of the question). We find 
that willingness to evade taxes follows a similar pattern as justification of tax evasion, even 
though significance levels vary. Willingness declines with age and is lower for women than 
for men. The perceived probability of being caught and the beliefs about others’ acceptance of 
tax evasion are significantly correlated with the willingness to evade taxes. Conditional on 
monthly pay, an increase in working hours by 10 percent is associated with a 2.7 percent 
higher probability of being willing to take home unreported income, however, this correlation 
is not statistically significant. 
  
In model 5 we report results from a probit model of the question:  Have you performed work 
during the last 12 months that is not (is not going to be) reported to the tax authorities? 
 
We find a positive correlation between working hours and the probability of actually having 
performed unreported work. The relationship is, however, not as strong as the relationship 
between working hours and justification or willingness, and not statistically significant. 
 
One potential problem with our finding is that justification, willingness and actual 
performance may be correlated, and that the effect of working time on the propensity to 
justify tax evasion may be affected by this correlation. We address this problem first by 
running a multivariate probit model that allows for arbitrary correlation between the three 
outcomes. The results are reported in table 4. We do indeed find a strong and significantly 
positive correlation between the three outcomes, even when conditioning on these variables. 
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We also find that the probability of justifying tax evasion is increasing in working hours, 
conditional on monthly earnings, even when we allow for a correlation between justification 
and the willingness and actual performance of tax evasion. Again, the effect of working hours 
is statistically significant for justification only.    
 
In the second part of table 4, we impose more structure on the model and investigate the role 
of justification on the probability of being willing to evade income and actually perform tax 
evasion directly, under the assumption that the direction of causality goes from norms to 
behaviour, but still allowing the error terms to be correlated across outcomes. 
  
Table 4. Norms and tax evasion: multivariate probit equations 
                       Justify         Willing       Actual      Justify           Willing      Actual   
                           b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se    
ln(Working hours)        1.0423**       .6697         .7942        1.1786**       .4341         .5585    
                        (.5297)       (.4470)       (.5716)       (.5383)       (.4667)       (.6021)    
Woman                   --.3238**     --.2633**     --.4700**     --.3345**     --.1816       --.3920**  
                        (.1619)       (.1306)       (.1872)       (.1615)       (.1377)       (.1993)    
Age                     --.0185**     --.0064       --.0058       --.0180**     --.0017       --.0013    
                        (.0075)       (.0063)       (.0083)       (.0076)       (.0067)       (.0089)    
Secondary education       .2226       --.0923         .1237         .2186       --.1214         .1141    
                        (.2244)       (.1767)       (.2266)       (.2258)       (.1791)       (.2318)    
Tertiary education        .3860*      --.2588       --.1516         .4004*      --.3507*      --.2509    
                        (.2318)       (.1836)       (.2403)       (.2334)       (.1875)       (.2494)    
ln(monthly pay)         --.3436       --.0417       --.2701       --.4070         .0179       --.1935    
                        (.2515)       (.2057)       (.2817)       (.2578)       (.2070)       (.2932)    
Marginal tax              .4778       --.7181       --.7898         .5798       --.9439       --.9994    
                        (.7909)       (.6656)       (.9721)       (.8032)       (.6795)      (1.0242)    
Prob(revealed)         --1.7292***   --1.5565***   --1.2563***   --1.7706***   --1.2872***    --.9717**  
                        (.3841)       (.2849)       (.4355)       (.3854)       (.3176)       (.4855)    
Generally accepted        .4709***      .7996***      .2490         .4970***      .7027***      .1230    
                        (.1540)       (.1199)       (.1749)       (.1552)       (.1340)       (.1908)    
Justify 
   
                   .9949***      .8423*   
    
                 (.3714)       (.4592)    
Constant                --.9819      --1.3266       --.7328       --.9919      --1.3095       --.8693    
                       (1.7581)      (1.4761)      (2.0444)      (1.7826)      (1.4986)      (2.1149)    
Cov JA      .3959*** 
  
   --.0561    
  
 
   (.1017)    
  
   (.2469)    
  Cov AW 
 
     .8286*** 
  
     .8255*** 
 
  
   (.1281)    
  
   (.1544)    
 Cov JW 
  
     .4796*** 
  
   --.0063    
   
   (.0911)    
  
   (.1913)    
N 532 532 532 532 532 532 
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Note: Probit coefficents. Levels of significance (*** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10). 
 
 
We find that under these assumptions, justification has a strong impact on both willingness to 
evade taxes and actual tax evasion. We also observe that the coefficient of working time on 
both willingness to evade taxes and actual tax evasion drops once we introduce justification 
into the equation, suggesting that the impact of working time mostly go through justification. 
Again, working hours have a statistically significant relationship with justification only. Of 
course, lack of convincing instruments for each of the outcomes necessitates caution with 
respect to the interpretation of this result, since feed-back effects from behaviour to 
justification are indeed possible. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed the questions of how fairness considerations affect tax 
evasion. In section 2 we developed a theoretical model in which we assumed that individuals 
were motivated by a desire for income and leisure and by a desire to act in accordance with 
what they consider to be fair. We furthermore assumed that they view it as fair that income is 
distributed in proportion to hours worked. Based on this model we predicted that for 
individuals with a given total income the propensity to justify tax evasion should be 
increasing in the number of hours worked. The empirical analysis conforms with this 
prediction, since individuals with low wages and long working hours are more likely to justify 
tax evasion. We have also found a strong positive relationship between the probability of 
justifying tax evasion and actual performance of unreported work.   
 
These results are consistent with a model in which individuals make a trade-off between 
economic gains and fairness considerations when they make decisions about tax evasion. 
Taken together our results suggest that considerations of fair income distribution are 
important for the analysis of tax evasion. 
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Table A1 Summary statistics 
  Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
ln(hours)* 3.60 0.18 3.22 4.17 
Woman (d) 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 42.39 10.33 20.00 63.00 
Tertiary  (d) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
ln(earnings=wagexhours*) 8.72 0.44 7.60 10.20 
Marginal tax* 0.41 0.09 0.15 0.75 
Accepted  (d) 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
P(caught)* 0.39 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Justify  (d) 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Willing  (d) 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Actual  (d) 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
 
N=532,  *) midpoints of brackets, (d) dummy variable. 
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